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Macroeconomic Adjustment 
under Wage-Price Rigidity 
Michael Bruno 
A fall in import prices constitutes an improvement in the terms of trade 
and is welfare increasing when wages and prices are fully flexible. Prob- 
lems of internal adjustment arise when they are downward sticky and the 
system is not otherwise in  a process of  rapid  change. Two kinds of 
short-run unemployment may occur. (1) Workers may be thrown out of 
jobs in the directly competing domestic industry because of a rise in the 
product wage. (2) Unemployment may arise as a result of contraction in a 
home industry which is an imperfect substitute on the demand side. The 
second kind of unemployment can in principle be remedied by macroeco- 
nomic expansion. Since it comes from the production side, the first type 
of  unemployment  requires  a  transfer  of  workers  from  the  import- 
competing industry to the home-goods sector. In the short run this means 
reducing the real product wage in that sector. If  the nominal wage is 
downward sticky but prices are upward flexible, this could, in principle, 
be brought about by expansionary fiscal policy (coupled with a devalua- 
tion). Under certain conditions, however, even that may not be possible 
if  it also entails a reduction in the real consumption wage. In this as well as 
the other case intervention on the supply side may be required. 
In practice, the employment replacement effects of the exports of NICs 
(newly industrialized countries) seem to have been relatively small. Since 
import competition is nothing new, one may ask why it has received so 
much more attention in recent years. A possible answer is that its effects 
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depend on the general economic environment. The supply shocks that 
affected industrial countries in the 1970s introduced structural adjust- 
ment problems of a kind that turn out to resemble those caused by import 
competition. At times of  rapid growth and excess demand in both the 
goods and labor markets, such as the late 1960s and early 1970s, import 
competition could alleviate shortages and reduce inflationary pressure. 
By contrast, during a period of  persistent slack, as after 1973, it may 
compound existing adjustment problems. 
The aim of  this paper is to clarify these issues in  the context of  a 
two-sector open economy macromodel which is analyzed in terms of the 
recent disequilibrium approach. Section 2.1 lays out a two sector model 
which incorporates a domestically producible import good and an export- 
able home good. The effect of  a fall in import prices under nominal or  real 
wage stickiness is analyzed within the main markets (goods, labor, and 
foreign exchange). We consider the differential response to import com- 
petition  under  the main  disequilibrium regimes.  We also discuss the 
extent to  which demand management and exchange-rate (or tariff) policy 
can be applied. Wage subsidies and capital accumulation are discussed in 
section 2.3. Section 2.4  relates the theory to the environment of  the 1970s 
and briefly considers the problem of  import competition in final goods 
within a modified framework in which the price of  key imported raw 
materials has risen. This helps to bring out the point that the adjustment 
problem depends crucially on the nature of the underlying macroecono- 
mic environment. 
2.1  Analytical Framework 
The effect of  import competition will here be analyzed within a conven- 
tional two-sector framework adapted to our specific  purpose.’ The import 
good can be produced by a perfectly competitive domestic industry whose 
output is denoted by XI.  With  domestic consumption  C1, the excess 
(C, -  XI)  is imported. Producers and consumers will face a domestic 
price p1 =pTeT, where pT  is the international cif.  price, e is the ex- 
change rate, and T is a tariff factor (1 + rate of  tariff). 
The other sector produces a home good Xo  at pricePo. This can be used 
for private consumption (C,), public consumption (Go), or investment 
(Z0).* Unlike in the simplest two-sector model, we shall assume that this 
good is semitradable. It can be exported as an imperfect substitute (Eo) 
for a world export good whose price is pz. This modification of  the basic 
model is helpful in that it allows for a distinction between imports and 
exports and at the same time maintains the simplicity of  a two-sector 
macromodel for the home economy. We now consider the main building 
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2.1.1  Production and Employment 
We  adopt  the  conventional  short-run  two-factor  production 
framework:  Xi = Xi(&,  Ki),  i = 0, 1. Labor (Li)  is  a variable factor 
whose total supply L is assumed to be fixed exogenously. Capital stock 
(Ki)  in both sectors is fixed in the short run (capital accumulation is 
discussed in section 2.3). Labor and capital are gross complements. 
Denoting the nominal wage by  w and allowing for a tax (subsidy) on 
wages (Oi = 1  + tax rate or 1 -  subsidy rate), we obtain the two notional 
labor-demand functions Lf  (  Bi w/pi,  Ki)  and the full-employment con- 
straint 
D~  = ~~~(eow/po,~o)  +Lf(e,tV/p,,  K,) -  L~O.  -+  -+ 
(1) 
For simplicity, it is assumed that when there is excess demand for labor 
(DL  >  0), only home-good producers are rationed in the labor market, 
i.e., Lo = L -  L~(81w/pl)<L;f(80w/po);  in that case dXo/~Lo>w/po. 
Figure 2.1 shows the two labor-demand curves in a box diagram whose 
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of the two curves at A (w = wo)  gives the equilibrium allocation of labor 
between sectors. For example, a fall in the price P1 will shift L1  to Li and 
at the given wage wo, unemployment of AC will erne~ge.~  If  the nominal 
wage were set at w'  <  wo,  there would be excess demand for labor of GE 
in the original position. By assumption, labor allocation would be repre- 
sented by the point G, below the curve Lo,  illustrating the case where 
w/po<aXo/aLo  (and w/pl = dXl/aL1). 
2.1.2  Product, Income, and Household Behavior 
Nominal GNP is given by poxo  +  PIXl;  real GNP in home-good units 
is Y = X, + X1/n,  where IT  =  po/pl  denotes the internal terms of  trade 
between the two sectors. Disposable household income is Y -  T,  where T 
is total (direct and indirect) net taxes in the system measured in units of 
Assume next that a given share c of disposable income is consumed (or 
s = 1 -  c is saved), while total consumption expenditure C is broken 
down into its components according to a standard consumption function 
C:'  = Ci(C,  IT), where C = Co + Cl/n. If  both goods are normal and are 
also gross  substitute^,^ we have 
XO. 
o<  Ci,< 1 
(2)  co,<o,  Cl,>O  c,, + c1,  = CI/?r 
c = c,  + C1/n = c(Y -  7)  = c(X0 +  XI/T -  T). 
c,, + C1,h = 1 
2.1.3  Equilibrium in the Home-Goods Market 
In  addition  to household  demand  for the home good Co, there  is 
exogenous demand for public consumption Go,  investment Zo  and export 
demand Eo.  The last is assumed to be a positive function of world income 
Y* and a negative function of  the relative price ratio po/ep$;  its price 
elasticity is assumed greater than unity. Total demand for the home good 
is 
X$  = C,[c(Y -  T),r  ] + Go + Zo + Eo(Y  *,po/ep,*),  +-  +- 
(3) 
where  Y = x,  + xyIT, xs, =  xl(81w/pl,K1), 
and X, = min (Xf,XS,). 
The notional supply of  Xo is given by a supply function XS,= Xo(B0w/ 
po,  KO).  Excess demand Do is defined as the difference Xf -  XS,. 
It is convenient to express all equilibrium conditions in terms of  two 
endogenous relative price variables IT  =  po/pl  and w1 = w/pl (as long aspl 
remains fixed this is the same as using the two nominal variables po  and 
w). The relative price  of  exports can  be  expressed in  the  form pol 
ep$ = TITIIT*,  where IT*  =p$/pT is the given international relative price 
ratio and T is the import tariff factor. Similarly, the real wage in home- 15  Macroeconomic Adjustment under Wage-Price Rigidity 
good units w/po can be written  as the ratio  wl/a. Equilibrium in the 
home-goods market can thus be defined as 
(4)  Do = x: -  xs,  = Do(IT,w1;z)  = 0, 
where z is the set of  exogenous variables (IT*,  Y*,Oi,Ki,  etc.). 
As shown in the appendix, the assumptions made so far guarantee that 
excess demand will  be  a negative function of  IT  (dD,/d1~<0),  as is 
required by stability. 
The sign of aDo/dwl is ambiguous. While an increase in the wage rate 
reduces the supply of Xo,  it also reduces disposable income and consump- 
tion through its effect on output in both sectors. There is no ambiguity 
when only wages are consumed  (see Neary  1980). As  shown in  the 
appendix, dDo/dw,>O iff cCo,<p,  where p = Loqo/(Loqo  + Llql) and 
qi are the labor-demand elasticities. This means that the marginal pro- 
pensity  to consume home  goods out  of  income is  smaller than  the 
weighted share of employment in the home-goods sector, a condition that 
will probably hold.s For convenience we shall indeed use the assumption 
a D/d w  >  0, and, in the absence of  a full-employment constraint, the 
elasticity of  the Do curve will in that case be greater than unity.6 
The  relevant curve, marked Do  in figure 2.2 (expressed in logarithms of 
IT  and wl),  divides the IT-W~ space into a region of excess supply (to the 
right of Do)  and an excess demand region (to the left of do).  An increase in 
Go,  Y*, IT*,  7,  Oo, or K1 increases Do, thus shifting the Do curve to the 
right, while an increase in T,  €I1,  or KO  shifts it to the left. 
2.1.4  The Three Main Regimes 
To give a fuller picture of  the main disequilibrium regimes, the labor- 
market equilibrium condition is also drawn in figure 2.2, now expressed 
in terms of the transformed variables IT  and wl: 
D=(IT,W~)  = L$(eowl/~,Ko)  + L;'(elwl,K1) -  LSO.  -+  -+ 
(1') 
As can easily be  shown, the equilibrium DL curve in the figure is 
upward sloping with elasticity fi = (Loqo + L1q1)-'Loq0, which is less 
than unity. Below DL there is excess demand for labor; above it there is 
excess supply. The curve will  be pushed up by  an increase in Ki  or a 
decrease in  Oi (the case of  wage subsidies). 
We can now combine the information about the markets for labor and 
home goods in order to consider the labor market under excess supply of 
home goods. 
When producers are constrained by the home-goods market, employ- 
ment Lo will be a positive function of  Xi,  which in turn is a negative 
function of the domestic (relative) price IT.  To maintain equilibrium in 
the labor market, the wage w1  will now have to fall, rather than rise, with 16  Michael Bruno 
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an increase in the price  7r.7 This leads to a downward sloping labor- 
equilibrium curve LD,  when there is excess supply in the home-goods 
market. The whole of  the region K, bordered by  DoALDo,  is one of 
generalized excess supply in both the labor and home-goods markets (but 
only the part under DL constitutes Keynesian unemployment). 
Any exogenous change such as fiscal policy, shifting the Do  curve to the 
right, will shift the curve LDo with it so that their intersection always 
moves along the notional full-employment line DL (see, for example, the 
shift from DoALDo  to DhA’LDA in figure 2.3). 
Next, note that by our assumption about labor allocation under ration- 
ing there will be no region in which excess supply of goods coincides with 
excess demand for labor.8  The same downward sloping curve (LD,)  must 
thus also be the continuation of the commodity-equilibrium curve Do  in 
the labor-rationing region. This leaves the whole of  region R as that of 
generalized excess demand (Malinvaud’s “repressed inflation” case).9 
The third region C, is the familiar case of  classical unemployment, 
combining excess demand for home goods with excess supply of  labor. 
Since in this model the notional supply of labor is taken as fixed, demand 17  Macroeconomic Adjustment under Wage-Price Rigidity 
0 
Fig. 2.3 
for home goods will not depend on labor-market restrictions. The differ- 
ence between  actual output Xo  = Xt((wl/.rr)  and the higher output de- 
mand X$  takes the form of  forced private savings (i.e., Go + Eo + 1, will 
always be supplied). 
2.1.5  The Current Balance of  Payments 
The current-account deficit is pT  (C, -  XI)  -  (po/e)  Eo in foreign cur- 
rency terms. For convenience, we divide this by pf  and refer to excess 
demand for tradable goods Df in real terms, 
Dj-= C~(C,T)  -Xi(BiWl,  Ki)  -TTEO(Y*,T/  T*)  ++  -+  +- 
(5) 
= Of (r,  w1;z). 18  Michael Bruno 
The signs of  the derivatives of  this excess demand function will, in 
general, be ambiguous with respect to the endogenous price ratios IT and 
wl.  As shown in the appendix, under reasonable assumptions we have 
-  a Do  /a IT >  a Df  /a IT >  0. 
Next, we have a Df/a w1  SO  iff 1 -  CC~JIT  = (1 -  c)  + cCo,5 p. If  a Df  / 
a w,  >  0,  Df  is negatively sloped.1° If  a Df  /a w1  <  0,  Df  is positively sloped 
and its slope is greater than that of  Do. The sign of  the slope makes no 
difference to our subsequent analysis. In the K(or the R)  region the slope 
of  Df  is definitely negative. 
The  line  Df  in  figure  2.2 relating  to  the  equilibrium  condition 
Df  (IT,  w,)  = 0  is drawn negatively sloped with deficits (Of >O)  on the right 
and surpluses  (Df<O)  on the left. This curve will  shift in  the same 
direction as Do  for changes in the relevant exogenous variables (z), with 
the exception of the sector-specific  Go and Zo.  By assumption, Xl is never 
rationed and the tradable-goods market need not clear." The monetary 
effect of  changes in foreign exchange reserves will be mentioned later. 
2.1.6  The Government Budget 
Two types of indirect taxes, a tax (subsidy) on  wages (9J and tariffs (T), 
have already appeared in the system. Next, assume that the government 
can levy a direct tax &which forms part of total net tax receipts (T). (This 
helps to allow for the net effect of an indirect tax [9, or T]  with total Theld 
constant.) Denoting the government deficit by Dg (measured in Xo units), 
we have 
where T = 
2.1.7  Savings, Investment, and Money 
Full-fledged treatment of  wealth formation requires detailed specifica- 
tion of supply and demand for physical as well as financial assets. This will 
not be attempted here. It is nonetheless of  some help to mention the 
simplest links that might close the system in this respect. The savings- 
investment identity can be put in  the form Z = S  -  Dg + Dfh, where 
Z = lo,  S  = private savings, and all magnitudes are expressed in home- 
goods units (assume here that T = 1). 
Suppose now that the current-account deficit is financed by  running 
down reserves and the government deficit is financed by  central bank 
credit, the sum of  these assets forming the money base H. The total 
quantity of money M can be controlled through the money multiplier m. 
One can thus write 
(6)  Dg = Go -  T, 
& + (w/po)  [ (9, -  l)Lo  + (9, -  l)L1] 
+ (T -  1)  (PT  ebo)  (C, -  XI). 
(7)  M = mH = m  [H-  1 +  PO (0, -  Df)  -  11 
= m[H+Po(S -  Z)I-l, 
where subscript -  1 indicates one-period lag. 19  Macroeconomic Adjustment under Wage-Price Rigidity 
Total investment Iequals gross capital accumulation in the two sectors. 
For simplicity  one may assume that AKi =  Zi(Ri-l,  M/po) -  S,Ki(i =  0,l) 
and Z  =  Zo + Zl,  where Ri are profits in sector i, Si is the depreciation rate, 
and M/po is a proxy for the negative effect of  the rate of  interest (on 
investment). In this way one can incorporate the effect of endogenous or 
planned changes in real balances in the short run as well as changes in 
profits on capital accumulation in the long run. Changes in Ki  will only be 
mentioned very briefly (see section 2.3). 
2.2  Analysis of Import Price Competition 
Let us now consider the impact effect of a reduction in foreign prices. 
We begin with the case in whichp;  andpg both drop, leaving the relative 
price ratio IT* unaffected. The advantage of considering this case first is 
that such a change does not alter the general equilibrium curves in figure 
2.2!2  At given pricePo and nominal wage level wj  the effect of a fall inpg is 
to increase the relative prices IT  and w  by the same amount, thus moving 
the economy from an initial equilibrium point A along a 45" vector to, 
say, the point B. This point is in the Keynesian unemployment region K, 
with excess supply in the commodity and labor markets as well as excess 
demand for traded goods. 
The intuitive explanation is straightforward. A fall in the import price 
raises the product wage in the Xl  industry, thus reducing employment 
and output in that sector. At given w/po  the potential output supply in the 
home-goods industry stays constant. However, the increase in the rela- 
tive price of home goods reduces the demand for Co at a given income and 
the fall in product and income further reduces Co.  Also, exports must fall 
since p;  has dropped. Producers of  Xo are thus rationed in the home- 
goods market; employment and output drop. 
Suppose the Walrasian general equilibrium point  remains at A. If 
prices and nominal wages were fully flexible, a reduction in both of them 
by the rate of the decrease in foreign prices would return the economy to 
equilibrium. If  nominal wages and prices are downward sticky, there is a 
policy tool that would have  the same effect,  namely,  a devaluation 
(increase in e) by the amount required to bring the domestic price pl, as 
well as IT  and wl,  back to its original value, in which case all markets 
return to equilibrium and all real magnitudes stay the same (the only 
difference now being that the foreign currency value of both imports and 
exports has been reduced). 
Next, let us consider the more relevant case in which only the price of 
imports (p:)  falls while the price of  exports (p;)  stays constant. This 
implies that the relative price IT*  rises. In this case import substitutes but 
not exports are hurt. In terms of  the general equilibrium system (see 
figure 2.3) the implication is that Do and D,both  shift to the right, to 06 
and Di,  respectively. As can be seen in the appendix, the relative shift is 20  Michael Bruno 
as shown; namely, Dfshifts to the right by less that Do and both shift by 
less than the initial change in logpr .  The intersection of 0; and DL is at Al 
and that of 06  and DL is at A'.  If  wages and prices were fully downward 
flexible, the new short-run Walrasian equilibrium would be at A',  if  the 
economy actively borrows to cover the remaining current-account deficit, 
or at A ,  if  foreign currency reserves are allowed to drop and the money 
supply is allowed to contract correspondingly (shifting 06  and LDA back 
to the left). At any rate the point B lies in the Kregion with respect to 
either Al  or A' just as in the previous case. But to reach an equilibrium, 
prices must now fall by less than wages. If wages and prices are downward 
rigid, a devaluation cannot by itself return the system to equilibrium. A 
devaluation  moving the  system back  from  B  to  C will  get only the 
home-goods market into equilibrium. A further move to C' will achieve 
current-account balance, but an inflationary gap emerges. A devaluation 
all the way to A will achieve full employment with excess demand in the 
home-goods market and a surplus in the current account. In theory both 
these gaps in  the home-goods and foreign exchange markets can be 
closed by  a suitable combination of  fiscal (G,  Go) and monetary (m) 
policy so that full-employment equilibrium can be achieved at A.  How- 
ever, this is obviously a wrong policy from the point of view of  optimum 
resource allocation since at A the original sectoral allocation of  labor 
would only be artificially preserved. 
What  if  wages and prices  are flexible upward and  are allowed to 
increase from A to  A' (or A J?  The resulting reduction in the real product 
wage in the home-goods industry may then bring about the required 
transfer of  workers from L1  to Lo. There are two qualifications to this 
solution. One is that the economy must be willing to pay the price of some 
inflation for this transfer (on the assumption that it would be enough to 
induce workers to move  from the depressed  industry into the more 
profitable one). The other qualification has to do with the possibility of 
real, rather than nominal, wage rigidity which may prevent such a re- 
duction in the product wage. 
Suppose the consumption basket of  wage earners consists of  propor- 
tions a  and 1 -  (Y of home and importable goods, respectively, so that the 
relevant consumption price index can be written in the form A&  p:  -01, 
and assume that w  'Ape" pi  -a.  A minimum real wage line w! can thus be 
defined by 
(8)  log ~1=  logA + alogn. 
This may provide an effective constraint on adjustment to full employ- 
ment iff  a>  p where p = Loqol(Loqo  + Ll-ql), the elasticity of  the full- 
employment line &.  In figure 2.3 it is represented by the line w,"  which 
lies between the 45" line (AB)  and DLf3  The higher the share (Y of  home 
goods in the wage earners' consumption basket and the higher the ratio 21  Macroeconomic Adjustment under Wage-Price Rigidity 
Llql/Loqo,  the less likely they will be to accept the real product wage cut, 
in home-good units, that is required to draw more employment into the 
Xo  sector so as to  compensate for the employment loss in the XI  sector. If, 
however, a<  p, this problem does not arise.I4 
What is to happen in practice depends on the particular context or 
phase in which import competition occurs. If  only a small share of  C1 is 
initially imported  and if  Xl is a relatively labor-intensive activity or 
ql>qo,  we may get a>  p. In that case, the real wage constraint will be 
effective in preventing the achievement of full employment by means of 
exchange-rate policy and demand management  alone. If, however,  a 
relatively large share of C1 is already imported and if labor intensities are 
about the same, then the share of  C1 in the consumption basket will be 
higher than the share of L1 in employment, and we get (Y >  p. In that case 
workers may be induced to move into the home-goods industry by  an 
increase in prices and wages due to an expansionary policy while the real 
consumption wage (wc)  also rises. The welfare gain of import competition 
will not be wasted. 
How would the analysis change if  the import price fall went together 
with expansion of the external market? What it means is that the Df  and 
Do  curves both shift further to the right. An extreme case would be one in 
which export expansion compensated fully for the rise in imports. In 
figure 2.3 this is shown by curve Djf  which passes through point B. The 
current account will now balance at B. If  there is no intervention in the 
commodity market, the corresponding equilibrium curve for home goods 
(Db’f)  must lie to the right of  B so that point B will be in the classical 
unemployment (C) region from the start. However, with excess demand 
in the commodity market, prices may be free to adjust upward, while the 
nominal wage remains downward rigid. Whether full employment can or 
cannot be reached will again depend on whether a real wage constraint 
has to be violated. In terms of  figure 2.3 the question is whether prices 
must go through a point such as Hon  the w! line (in the case (Y >  p) on the 
way to equilibrium. 
The same consideration applies to the question whether in the absence 
of  exchange-rate adjustments demand management alone could return 
the system to equilibrium. The curve Do  can always be pushed far enough 
to  the right from B so that at given nominal wage inflation will reduce w/po 
sufficiently to reach full employment on the DL line. In addition to the 
problem of the current account, which requires suitable fiscal treatment, 
the feasibility of  such a policy will  depend  on whether  a real wage 
constraint is or is not violated. 
2.2.1  Response under Different Regimes 
So far we have analyzed the effect of an import price reduction starting 
from an equilibrium.  If  the economy is initially in the K region, the 22  Michael Bruno 
adjustment difficulties are more pronounced a fortiori. The import price 
change would then increase excess supply in both the home-goods and 
the labor market. Things look slightly different if  the initial point happens 
to be in the Cregion. Say the equilibrium set of curves is given by DL,  DA'  , 
and LDA'  while the economy, initially at point C, moves to  point B.  Here, 
an import price fall removes the need for the upward adjustment in the 
domestic price level that would be required to eliminate excess demand in 
the home-goods market. However, in moving from point C to B unem- 
ployment increases just the same. 
One would get the best of both worlds if  the initial point happened to 
be in the R region, that is, if  the economy started from an inflationary, 
generalized excess demand, situation. An import price drop, for exam- 
ple, a move from G to  A,  might serve to eliminate excess demand in both 
the commodity and labor markets, thus automatically producing an anti- 
inflationary result! 
The effect of  an import price change on excess demand under the 
various regimes is of  some interest in itself. Consider first the effect on 
excess demand (supply) in the home-goods market. We have a Dolap: = 
cCoc  (a Yldp:)  -  (dp;) C,,  -  a XS,lap:.  Calculating a Ylap:  for each 
of the regions C, K, R and denoting the labor share in X,  by +1, we get 
--  aye-  ('TTPT) -%(1+  +lrll) '  0, 
aPT 
(9) 
aYc  aYc  -- - (1 -doc)- 7  aYK 
aP:  aP1  aP  1 
> *' 
Now dXoldp,*  = 0 for the C and Kregions but aXS,lap,*  = -  (dXo/a  Lo) 
q1L1/pr < 0 in the R region since in this case XS,  = Xo  (L - Ll). 
A reduction  in pT  thus causes income to fall and excess supply to 
increase more in the Kthan in the Cregion. In the Rregion, income either 
falls by  less or even increases, while the increase in XS, (which is due to 
relaxation of  labor rationing) helps to reduce excess demand in the R 
region by more than in the C region (a DF  lap;  <  d DzldpT by [9]) thus 
bringing out the potential anti-inflationary role of import price reduction 
under generalized excess demand. 
Next, consider the current account under alternative regimes. Dif- 
ferentiating (pT Df)  with respect to p,*,  one gets, after some manipula- 
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Applying the value of  d Y/dp,*  given in (9) to each of the three regimes, 
we can conclude that (a)  a fall inp:  increases the current-account deficit 
under all three regimes (the derivative in [lo] is always negative); and (b) 
the ordering of the regimes by the size of the deficit increment is R > C 
The stronger anti-inflationary effect of an import price reduction under 
the R regime is thus obtained at the cost of a greater deterioration in the 
current-account deficit, a trade-off which  makes intuitive sense. The 
effect on excess supply of  labor coming from an import price drop is the 
same under all three regimes (dD,/dp;  = L1ql/p:)  since, by  assump- 
tion, producers in the XI  sector are always on their notional demand 
curve for labor. 
2.2.2  Tariff Changes 
The discussion of  import price changes as an anti-inflationary device 
seems somewhat artificial since a change in p: is an exogenous change 
over which the economy usually has no control. Suppose, however, that 
one applies the same argument to a planned change in the domestic price 
p1  through a reduction in an existing tariff. Inspection of the underlying 
model shows that a change in T  works in almost exactly the same way as a 
change in p,* except for its different quantitative effect on the current 
account. (A 1  percent drop in T  worsens the current account by more than 
a 1  percent drop inp: .  The same applies in reverse, to the imposition of a 
tariff .) However, the geometrical analysis (movement along a 45" line 
plus rightward shift of Do and Of  curves) for the home-goods and labor 
markets works in the same way.I6 
In a similar way one can analyze the effect of a tariff imposed in order 
to counteract the effect of a fall in p:  . This is analogous to a devaluation 
(a move back from B along a 45" line) except that a simultaneous upward 
shift takes place in curves Dfand Do.  The distortionary effects of a tariff 
are well known and need not be repeated here. 
The upshot of this section is that the effect of import competition and 
the problems of  adjustment cannot be treated without considering the 
regime in which the economy happens to be when this change takes place. 
It will help to alleviate an inflationary situation (in both markets in an R 
regime and in the commodity market in a C regime). It may aggravate an 
existing unemployment situation (in the Kor Cregime) if  the wage rate or 
the real consumption wage is downward sticky. The additional unem- 
ployment originating in the import-competing sector cannot always be 
removed by  Keynesian demand management policies. In principle, a 
change in the exchange rate can be used, in conjunction with demand 
management, to cure unemployment, but there is always a price to be 
paid in terms of inflation. If the real wage constraint is effective (a  >  p), a 
return to full employment would also involve resource misallocation 
>  K.I5 24  Michael Bruno 
since the adjustment to a new efficient labor allocation would then be 
prevented. 
2.3  Supply Management and Capital Accumulation 
How should the previous analysis be modified if the response of invest- 
ment to changes in profits is taken into account?” Consider the initial 
experiment in which the import price falls, starting from equilibrium at 
A. The same forces that reduced employment in both sectors will  also 
reduce profits and investment. This has two effects. One is a further 
downward pressure on aggregate demand (pushing the Do curve to the 
left),  thus  increasing  excess  supply  in  the  home-goods  and  labor 
markets.18  The other, long-run, effect is a fall in Ki,  which reduces the 
optimum level of  employment in both sectors. In terms of  the general 
equilibrium picture this expresses itself in  a downward pull on the DL 
curve, thus exacerbating or creating unemployment. A similar analysis 
will hold if  the economy is initially in the C region. Only in the R region 
could a fall inp; bring about an increase in profits, just as it could lead to 
an increase in total income. 
The effect on capital accumulation can  be  discussed in the wider 
context of  supply management policy. As we have seen, import competi- 
tion under wage (and price) rigidity leads to unemployment (except in the 
R  region) which demand management and exchange-rate policy may not 
be able to solve effectively; or else it might lead to inflation. Policy 
measures which push up the full-employment line DL  may thus be called 
for. The simplest tool, in the short run, is a wage subsidy (or a reduction 
in employment tax) in the X1  sector. This introduces a wedge between the 
product wage and the consumption wage and may enable producers to 
continue production of XI  without loss. In terms of our model this implies 
a reduction in el and a corresponding upward shift in the DL curve (as well 
as a rightward shift in the Do and Dfcurves).’9  In principle, employment 
L1 can be kept at its original level (with equilibrium at point B) if  el is 
determined so that e,/p,*  stays constant. This wage subsidy would be 
superior to a tariff because it avoids the distortionary tax on consumption 
of C1 (see Johnson 1962; Bhagwati and Ramaswami 1963). However, it 
shares with the tariff the distortionary feature of freezing the productive 
structure (together with profits and the composition of investment). 
Any measure that would help workers move out of sector XI  into sector 
Xo would be better.  One candidate in  the present context is a wage 
subsidy (or reduced employment tax) in the home-goods industry. This 
would decrease the product wage Oow/po  (without having to raisePo) and 
thus increase XS,.  In order to be effective, however, it must be coupled 
with expansionary measures or a devaluation.20 
Another choice might be investment promotion measures to increase 
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on  Xi(Oo,  KO),  with devaluation cum fiscal policy, might be superior. To 
make this statement more precise involves a more extensive analysis of 
intertemporal choice, which is beyond the scope of  this paper. (For an 
analysis centered on long-run adjustment, see chapters 3 and 4  of this 
volume). 
2.4  Structural Problems of  the 1970s: An  Interpretation 
When one leaves the theoretical framework for a moment and consid- 
ers the world developments of  the 1960s and 1970s, two riddles present 
themselves. One has to do with empirical estimates of  the effect of NIC 
exports on employment in industrial countries. Empirical studies have 
invariably shown that employment-replacement effects of  NIC exports 
are minute.21  If  they are so small, what is all the fuss about? The second 
riddle, which may be connected with the first, has to do with the timing of 
the debate. It would seem that in the 1960s,  when NIC export penetration 
was at its most rapid, the issue of  internal adjustment was not a major 
policy concern in OECD countries; more recently, however, it has be- 
come a major issue-at  a time when the rate of penetration appears to 
have slowed down.” 
A partial answer to the first question lies in the distinction between net 
and gross employment  effects.  A  specific sector may  be  very badly 
affected while the net employment effect on the economy as a whole may 
be small or even positive (in terms of our model, consider a combination 
of  a fall in p; and a substantial increase in Y* and KO). 
Another answer, which  also relates to the second question, is the 
crucial role played by the general economic environment in which import 
competition takes place. During much of the 1960s and until 1973 indus- 
trial economies enjoyed rapid expansion of both productive capacity and 
external trade opportunities. More often than not, industrial economies 
found themselves in the R regime. Even if  the business cycle would now 
and then throw an economy into a Kregime, unemployment was never 
very prolonged and it was Keynesian-it  could be eliminated by pure 
demand expansionU  Moreover, it may be that investment behavior antici- 
pated the need to adjust to changes in relative prices; in any event, such 
adjustments are easier to make when the system is expanding. The events 
of 1973-74  came as an unexpected shock to the system and started a 
period of  prolonged unemployment, a good part of  it classical. Under 
such conditions import competition imposes an extra strain on a system 
which is already stuck with a structural adjustment problem. 
Our model can be modified so as to illustrate this point. Let us intro- 
duce an imported intermediate input N into the production of  the home 
good; its international price is p,* and its relative price T, = p,*  lp;  = 
pn/p,  (with T = 1). Suppose the intermediate input and labor are cooper- 
ant factors.24  In the labor market an increase in p,* will  work like an 26  Michael Bruno 
increase in 0,:  it will shift the DL curve downward (see DL  in figure 2.4).  In 
the commodity market the increase inp;  will show as a shift to  the right of 
the Do curve (see the move from Do to 06  in figure 2.4).25  Both these 
changes shift the economy from an initial equilibrium at A into the C 
region (relative to the new Walrasian equilibrium at E in figure 2.4).  If  at 
the same time world demand contracts and investment demand falls (in 
response to lower profitability in the X, industry), or if  demand policy is 
contractionary, the Do  curve may shift to the left by more than the impact 
effect of pn (move to D6' in figure 2.4).  In that case the economy may find 
itself in the Kregion (see A relative to F),  but it is important to stress that 
the resulting unemployment is only partly Keynesian; i.e.  given real 
wage rigidity, pure expansionary policy may fail to restore full employ- 
ment. 
If  import competition in X,  is superimposed on this situation, it only 
magnifies the existing structural problem. In terms of  the analysis of the 
labor market (figure 2.1), this can be shown as follows: output in the X, 
sector is now constrained along the curve Xhd, with employment Lo at 
point M. 26 The notional labor demand curve has shifted to the left (Lb). 
Total unemployment (MC) at the nominal wage level wo  now consists of 
some purely Keynesian unemployment (MN)  ,  classical unemployment 
originating in the home-goods industry (NA ), and some unemployment 
from the X,  industry (AC). In both types of  external shock it is supply 
management policy that may be called for. 
This brief discussion may help to show why  import competition has 
played a leading role in policy discussions in the industrial countries in 
recent years, a role quite out of  proportion to its real long-run relative 
importance. 
One final qualification-we  have assumed all along that import com- 
petition takes place in final goods while the rise in import prices was 
confined to intermediate goods. This seems, by and large, an empirically 
reasonable assumption to make, since the bulk of  export penetration is in 
final goods. However, where there is also import competition in in- 
termediate goods (e.g., steel or paper), the same framework can be 
turned  round  to show that  a price  drop may  in  fact  increase  total 
employment  .D 
Appendix 
Slope of  the Do Curve 
Differentiating Do = X," -  Xi  (as defined in [3] and [4]) by T,  we have 
aY  aDoiaT = ccOc -  + c,, + E,, -  x,,  .  an 27  Macroeconomic Adjustment under Wage-Price Rigidity 
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Now Xo,=Xo+oqo/~,  and since,  in  the  unconstrained case,  Y  = 
&[L,(w,/IT)]  + Xl(wl)/Tl,  we have 
(A21  a Y/an  = x,, -  x1h2  = (xo+oqo  -  X,/~F)/~, 
where +o  is the elasticity of  X, with respect to Lo and qo  is the demand 
elasticity of Lo  with respect to w/po.  Also, Eo, <  0, COT  <  0, by assump- 
tion, and thus 
(A3)  aD,/aT  = -  7F-  [ccocxl/7F  + (1 -  ccoc)x~+oqo] 
+ Ch  + Eo, <  0. 
Similarly, since Xowl  = -  Loq0/n  and Xlwl  = -  Llql, 
(A41  ar/aw,  = -  (Loqo + L,q,)I?r<O 
and thus 28  Michael Bruno 
aY 
awl  a Doh  w1 = doc(-)  -  Xowl 
= [(I -  CCOc)~OqO  -  CCOC~l~ll/~. 
It follows that a DO/a  w,> 0 iff cCoc/(l - doc)  <  LOqo/Llql  or iff cCoc < 
p, where p = (LOqO  + Llql) -'  LOqO  (see section 2.1.3). When this condi- 
tion holds, we also have 
This is easily seen by recalling that +O  = w1LO/nXO. 
Slope of  the Df  Curve 
Differentiating Df  in equation (5)  with respect to IT,  we have 
ay 
(A71  dDf/an = cClc (=)  + C1,  -  7(EO  + nEOT). 
Now CIT  >  0 and EO  + nEoT  <  0 by assumption. By (A2), a Y/an >  0 if 
+orlo >  Xl/nXo. This is an empirically reasonable assumption. At any 
rate, it is a sufficient (but by  no means necessary) condition for a Of/ 
an >  0. 
Next, 
= (1 -  cC&)L1q1-  (cc~c/lT)Loqo. 
Thus  aDf/awl  >  0  iff  (1 -cClc/n)/(cClC/n)  > LOqo/Llql  or  iff 
(1 -  c) + cC, <  p (see section 2.1.5). If both derivatives are positive, we 
get 
The sign of the slope of  Df  outside the C region is unambiguously 
negative.  In the  K region, we  have  Y = Xf  + Xl/n and  thus  aYK/ 
awl= -Llql/~(l-cCOc)  <OandaYK/an=(-Xl/n2 + COT+EOT)/ 29  Macroeconomic Adjustment under Wage-Price Rigidity 
(1 - doc)  < 0. Then aDf/aw, = (1 - c)qlL1/(l - doc)  > 0 and 
dDf/d.rr = [C,, -  + 7rE0,)](1  -  A) -  (T - 1)nE0,, where A  = 
(cClc/m)/[(l -  c) + cClc/~]  <  1. Thus a Df/a.rr >  Ounambiguouslyin the 
Kregion and the slope of  Df  must be negative. If Df  happens to pass 
through the Rregion (e.g., if Dfis shifted to the left in figure 2.2), a similar 
analysis shows that its slope is negative in that region too. 
Relative Shifts of Do and Df  When p;  Changes 
change in p; . We get 
Let us denote by (d.rrDo/dp:) the shift of Do along the IT  axis due to a 
Similarly, 
) = 0.  TEO, 
ITT  (- 
aDf  anDf 
an  ap:  P1* 
-  -- 
Multiply (A9) by ITT and add to (A10) to get 
aDo  anDo  aDf  aaDf 
aT  apt  an  ap; 
+-  --  IT7 - -  - 0, 
and therefore 
Now, from (Al) and (A7) we find a Do/a  IT  + IT-'  (a Df  /a IT) = T  -2 [  (1 - 
c)  (X, -  ITX~+~~~)  + Eov(l -  T)]  < 0 for T sufficiently close to 1, and 
assuming a Y/an > 0 as before. Thus -  a Do/a.rr > IT-'  (a Df/an) 2 




1. See Helpman (1976), Bruno (1976), Brecher (1978), and R~idseth  (1979) for applica- 
tions of  such a model in a Walrasian general-equilibrium setup. Neary (1980) has recently 
given a disequilibrium formulation of such a model along the lines of  Malinvaud (1977). A 
similar approach also underlies Bruno and Sachs (1979). See also Liviatan (1979). 
2. For simplicity we here assume there is no GI and Il in the X1  sector, although these 
could easily be incorporated. 
3.  We shall show later that this is augmented by an additional contractionary effect on  the 
demand for home goods (AB in figure 2.1). 30  Michael Bruno 
4.  This assumption could be relaxed; see Hanoch and Fraenkel (1979). 
5. E.g., if  c = 0.8, C,,  = 0.9, Cl,h = 0.1, it will hold so long as Ll~,I(Loq0)  <  0.39, 
i.e., even if XI is very labor-intensive relative to X,. 
6.  The alternative, with the above inequalities reversed, leads to a negatively sloped Do 
curve. This causes no particular problem, but will not be dealt with here. 
7. This can be seen as follows from figure 2.1: a fall in X," can be represented as a leftward 
shift of the vertical line X,"  from the previous equilibrium point A to B (at given nominal 
wage wo).  Effective labor demand for Lo is no  longer represented by the demand curve Lo 
(which will anyway shift up  with a rise inp,).  Equilibrium in the labor market can take place 
only at the point H, where the nominal wage is below the marginal value product in the X, 
industry. 
8.  This would be the underconsumption (U)  region in the terminology of Muellbauer and 
Portes (1978). The notation  K,  C, and R  is taken from their paper. 
9.  If part of  L1  were also rationed, the continuation of  the Do curve would lie to the left of 
LDo with the R region correspondingly truncated. 
10. When c is close to 1, this is the same condition as in section 2.1.3, but there is no 
presumption that it is so here. 
11. The only way in which rationing does come in is through the effect of  various regimes 
on  the income response, and thus on  the demand for C, (see section 2.2). 
12. For the moment we also assume that the external market (Y')  remains unchanged. 
13. In the labor market (figure 2.1) a fall inp, to pi will reduce the minimum nominal 
wage, which is consistent with a fixed real consumption wage, from wn = Aptpi  -a  to w' = 
Ap;  (pi)'-" < wo. At given p, and w' and with equilibrium in the home-goods market, 
unemployment would be EF (this corresponds to the intersection of  D[ and w:  in figure 
2.3). 
14.  When the expenditure elasticity for home goods is close to unitary and wage earners' 
consumption is representative  of  total household consumption, we  have a = Cnc.  The 
difference between the condition on the slope of wz and that on the slope of Do  (see section 
2.1.3) will thus depend mainly on  how far c falls short of unity. The  assumption cC,, <  p and 
the case a  > p are not mutually exclusive. 
15. E.g., for the Kregime we find, after substitution from (9), that a($  Df)/ap: = 
T*C,,, -  (1 -  cC,,)  (1 -  c) (1 + C$~T,)  <  0 (since C,,  < 0). The rest follows from the 
fact that dYRi  dYc< aYK. 
16. In this case one has to assume a compensatory adjustment in direct taxes Td so as to 
keep total tax receipts T constant. 
17. We again ignore changes in real money balances. 
18.  We here ignore the reverse pull of  new investment directed toward NICs. 
19.  Again it is assumed that T stays constant; thus  must be increased so as to finance 
the subsidies (or the reduction in employment tax). In terms of  figure 2.1 curve Li will shift 
back. 
20.  The expansion must not only compensate for the fall in demand (X,"),  but also take 
up the extra slack entailed by an increase in XS,. In terms of  figure 2.3, DL may be pushed up 
to pass through point B while demand management shifts Do  to 0;.  Alternatively, one can 
devalue from B to C or C'  and use wage subsidies to push the DL  curve up to pass through 
one of  these points. 
21.  This literature is summarized in a recent OECD report (1979). See also Baldwin, 
Mutti, and Richardson (1978) and Krueger (1979). 
22.  Between  1963 and  1973 the share of  NICs  in  OECD imports of  manufactures 
increased  from  2.6 to 6.8 percent. The figures for the following years,  1974-77,  are, 
respectively 7.1, 6.8, 7.9, and 8.1 percent (see OECD 1979, p. 23, table 4). 
23.  In figure2.4 the point A'  relative to  equilibrium at A is in the Kregion, but a shift from 
Do to Dh  returns the system  to full employment.  This would  not  be so if  Walrasian 
equilibrium were, for example, at point E. 31  Macroeconomic Adjustment under Wage-Price Rigidity 
24.  For a fuller discussion of  such a model, see Bruno and Sachs (1979). The disequilib- 
rium formulation of  that model is analyzed in an unpublished working paper by the present 
author. 
25.  An increase inp; shifts Xi  supply downward. Similarly, real income will now fall [it is 
now measured as Y  = Xo  (1 -  ~L?T,/'IT)  + X,/.rr,  where p is the intermediate import ratio]. 
With a sufficiently strong supply effect, Do shifts to the right, as with an increase in Bo. 
26.  There are now two variable inputs in the Xo  sector, and it can be shown that cost 
minimization at a given output level gives a downward sloping output-constrained labor- 
demand curve which is steeper than the notional Lo  demand curve but is not vertical unless 
intermediate inputs are used in fixed proportions. 
27.  In this case the fall in L1  must be weighed against an increase in Lo  coming from gross 
complementarity  of  a variable input whose price has dropped. The net effect on total 
employment is an empirical matter. 
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COlTlment  J. Peter Neary 
Anyone interested in macroeconomic theory who crosses the Atlantic 
these days suffers not merely from jet lag but from a strong sense of 
intellectual dislocation, such are the differences between the two conti- 
nents in the accepted ground rules for macroeconomic debate. Michael 
Bruno’s extremely rich and interesting paper has spared me some of  this 
sense of dislocation, but since the “disequilibrium” (or, more accurately, 
“temporary equilibrium with rationing”) approach which he pursues is 
much less acceptable to North American audiences, I want to begin by 
making some general comments on this class of  models. 
The main target for criticism of these models is of course their assump- 
tion of fixed prices. Whenever I am asked, “Who sets prices?” in such a 
model, I am tempted to reply facetiously that prices are set by-a  little 
green man! This is no ordinary little green man, however, but the same 
one who in many other models moves prices costlessly and instantane- 
ously to their Walrasian or market-clearing levels, except that he is on an 
off  day! In other words, I know of  no macromodel which provides a 
satisfactory choice-theoretic basis for its assumptions about price deter- 
mination. Devotees of  an efficient Walrasian auctioneer do not have a 
monopoly of  virtue in this field and tend to forget that “titonnement” 
literally means “groping,” which may be many things but is certainly not 
instantaneous. 
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and Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
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The same point may be made differently using a parallel which should 
appeal to specialists in international economics. In  the literature on 
devaluation theory a great many papers assume that external payments 
are initially balanced. Naive commentators sometimes suggest that these 
models are fatally flawed, for why would an economy which starts off in 
external balance ever have recourse to devaluation? But this criticism is 
of course misplaced, since the same analysis applies whatever the initial 
situation. Starting in a situation of  payments imbalance may introduce 
some additional complications (as pointed out, for example, in the note 
by Hanoch and Fraenkel 1979 cited by Bruno), but the gain in analytic 
clarity of  assuming initial balance more than outweighs the loss in real- 
ism. In the same way, although the fixed-prices models do in fact pick 
prices out of the air, it is unfair to interpret this literally. Rather, they 
should be seen as examining a snapshot of  a dynamic economy in which 
the current wage-price vector is inherited from the past, perhaps from an 
earlier Walrasian equilibrium which was disturbed by exogenous forces. 
Although wages and prices do not respond immediately, pressures to 
change them will build up over time, and in the medium run they are 
likely to converge toward a new Walrasian equilibrium. However, before 
this happens (and there is as yet virtually no basis in economic theory for 
asserting how long the process will take) there is plenty of  time for the 
short-run phenomena emphasized by Michael Bruno to take their course. 
In opposition to these arguments there is, especially in North America, 
a widely held view that rapid, if not instantaneous, price adjustment is an 
almost inevitable concomitant of rationality and, in particular, of rational 
expectations. However, I would argue that these are two quite distinct 
issues. For example, in a paper by Joe Stiglitz  and myself it is shown that, 
if  prices are fixed and expected to remain so, not only will agents face 
quantity constraints today but rational agents will foresee constraints in 
the future, and such perfect foresight-r  “rational constraint expecta- 
tions” as we call it-enhances rather than emasculates the effectiveness 
of perfectly anticipated government policy. (Of course, not everyone is 
convinced by  the model in that paper-indeed,  since it assumes that 
prices are fixed both now and for the rest of time, a monetarist colleague 
of  mine, Colm McCarthy, has dubbed it a model of  Albania!) 
As for the argument that rational expectations in themselves will lead 
either to instantaneous price flexibility or, more subtly, to rational fix- 
price  contracts which fully embody all available ex  ante  information 
leaving no role for discretionary policy, this appears to me to reflect an 
unconvincing jump from one level of reasoning to another. Rationality of 
expectations or its absence is an assumption about individuals and their 
perceptions, whereas the process of price formation reflects a much wider 
range of  institutional features, including the rate at which information is 
disseminated between, and the incentives for coordinating the actions of, 34  Michael Bruno 
atomistic agents. In an infinitely repeated steady state it is conceivable 
that market institutions which come to reflect rational expectations will 
embody price flexibility, and the conditions under which this will occur 
are an important topic for research; however, in the moving temporary 
equilibria with which macroeconomics must be concerned there is no 
logical reason why one should imply the other. 
Turning at last to Michael Bruno’s paper itself, it is one of  a growing 
number which apply the Barro-Grossman-Malinvaud approach to an 
open economy. In trying to  compare it with other contributions, I found it 
helpful to ask the question, Does Bruno’s model describe a small open 
economy? At one level the answer is trivially no, for Bruno explicitly 
assumes that the “home” good Xo  is an imperfect substitute for a foreign 
good and that the level of exports of Xo  is a decreasing function of their 
relative price. Bruno’s economy can thus in principle influence its terms 
of  trade, which distinguishes it from the disequilibrium models of  Dixit 
(1978), Liviatan (1979), Kennally (1979), Neary (1980), and Steigum 
(1980), in which the world prices of  all traded goods are assumed to be 
parametric.  However,  while  Bruno’s assumption of  some monopoly 
power in export markets may well be more appropriate, even for rela- 
tively small economies such as Ireland or Israel, I do not believe that this 
is a crucial feature of his model. In the first place all prices in his model are 
fixed over the short-run horizon which he considers, so that the terms of 
trade do  not in fact change endogenously, even in response to substantial 
excess supply of exports. Second, the implications of his model would be 
unaffected if  he assumed that the world price of  Xo was exogenously 
given, but replaced the export demand function in equation (3) by an 
exogenous export sales constraint  Eo. This draws attention to the fact 
(which also emerges from Steigum’s model) that there are two distinct 
dimensions to the usual assumption of a small open economy: first, world 
prices of traded goods are fixed, and second, it is possible to buy or sell an 
infinite amount at these prices (i.e., there are no export sales or import 
supply constraints). Putting  this another way, the familiar device of 
aggregating exportables and importables into a composite traded good 
requires that their shadow prices to domestic agents rather than their 
market prices stand in fixed proportions to one another, and this will not 
be the case if agents face quantity constraints. Thus it is the presence or 
absence of  quantity constraints, rather than the fixity or variability of 
prices, which determines whether disequilibrium phenomena will emerge 
in traded goods markets. Of course, it is possible to retain both compo- 
nents of  the small-open-economy assumption and still generate goods- 
market disequilibrium by  postulating a purely nontraded good whose 
price is sticky. This is the approach adopted in my own paper, and except 
for this difference in interpretation and some relatively minor differences 
in specification (for example, I assume that profits are not redistributed 35  Macroeconomic Adjustment under Wage-Price Rigidity 
instantaneously, that labor supply is endogenous, and that savings are not 
separable from commodity expenditures), the two models are extremely 
similar. 
Another way of  putting Bruno’s paper in perspective is to compare it 
with similar models of a broadly “neoclassical” kind. Doing this makes it 
clear that many models share the same basic structure, however we may 
label them: for example, the condition derived by Bruno in his appendix 
for the effect of  an increase in wages on the excess demand for home 
goods has also been derived by Helpman (1977) and Noman and Jones 
(1979) in two papers which ignore explicit disequilibrium considerations 
such as Clower’s dual decision hypothesis and simply append a rigid wage 
to an otherwise orthodox neoclassical model. Moreover, these models 
are actually more similar than Bruno’s to that of Dixit, which, though it 
pays careful attention to the consequences of  qudntity constraints, ex- 
hibits extremely  “classical” properties,  since all goods can be  freely 
traded at fixed world prices. Indeed, there seems to be a general principle 
operating here, reminiscent of the general theory of the second best: the 
failure of  one market  to clear by  price  adjustment  in  an otherwise 
neoclassical environment (as in the models of  Dixit, Liviatan, and Ken- 
nally) does not of itself give rise to  distinctively  disequilibrium  properties. 
Rather, it takes at least two sets of quantity constraints to produce these, 
and it is the simultaneous relaxation of quantity constraints on two sets of 
agents  which  gives rise  to  such quintessentially disequilibrium phe- 
nomena as the Keynesian (or perhaps I should say “neo-Keynesian”) 
demand multiplier. 
While I am extremely sympathetic to Michael Bruno’s model in gen- 
eral, I have some reservations about his treatment of  investment. Like 
Pentti Kouri I found the inclusion of  real balances in the investment 
function as “a  proxy for the negative effect of  the rate of  interest” 
somewhat unconvincing. More  satisfactory methods  of  endogenizing 
investment would be either to include a bond market with an explicit 
interest rate or to try to model the firm’s intertemporal decision problem 
(the approach explored in Neary and Stiglitz 1982). The latter method 
would also avoid an implication of  Bruno’s model that investment deci- 
sions are unrelated to firms’ production decisions and in particular are 
independent of the regime which prevails in the current period. Dropping 
this feature of the model would permit a regime of  “underconsumption” 
in which  firms were rationed on both  labor and goods markets.  (Of 
course, proliferation of regimes is not desirable in itself, but the failure to 
allow for an underconsumption regime can lead to problems in studying 
price dynamics, problems which I believe to be of  more mathematical 
than economic interest .) Allowing investment to be regime-dependent 
would also avoid the implication that it is always profit-constrained. With 
persistent  Keynesian unemployment,  or when  firms have pessimistic 36  Michael Bruno 
expectations, we  would  expect  desired investment  to fall  below  the 
profit-constrained level, which would eliminate the additional depressive 
effect of  a fall in import prices mentioned in section 2.3. 
Finally, the policy implications of  Bruno’s model, as with many other 
disequilibrium models, are very similar to those of traditional Keynesian 
analysis, though with more satisfactory microfoundations and more care- 
ful consideration of the circumstances in which particular policy measures 
are or are not  appropriate. Thus one of  his main  conclusions,  that 
adjustment is easier when labor and commodity markets are tight, is 
hardly  novel; however, it derives new force from being expressed in 
terms of  a contrast between an economy alternating between states of 
Keynesian  unemployment  and  repressed  inflation,  and  one pushed 
deeply into classical unemployment by  large exogenous rises in input 
prices. As far as the specific topic of  this conference is concerned, Bruno 
adds a third justification for adjustment assistance to the allocative and 
distributional arguments which have been put forward in other papers- 
namely, the use of  adjustment assistance as a supplement to macroeco- 
nomic policies in the presence of wage and price rigidities. This may well 
come closest  to a  positive  economic  explanation  of  why  adjustment 
assistance has been  provided  in practice,  but  any  attempt to base  a 
welfare-theoretic case for adjustment assistance on it brings us back to 
the question of  how wages and prices are set in the first place, which has 
been extensively discussed in earlier sessions. As with so many other 
things, it all depends on what you believe about the little green man! 
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